The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more normative policy?  CEPS Policy Brief No. 329, March 2015 by Merabishvili, Gela
 Gela Merabishvili is a Research Assistant at the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
CEPS Policy Briefs present concise, policy-oriented analyses of topical issues in European affairs. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the author in a personal capacity and not to any 
institution with which he is associated. 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu)  © CEPS 2015 
Centre for European Policy Studies▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
The EU and Azerbaijan: Game on for a more normative policy? 
Gela Merabishvili 
No. 329, March 2015 
 
Key points 
The contradictory interests of the EU and Azerbaijan have brought negotiations on their contractual 
relations to a halt. The EU’s dependence on Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources has weakened the 
normative dimension of its policy towards Azerbaijan, rendering it incapable of countering rejection of 
democratic reform by Azerbaijan’s authorities. While the EU’s current approach seems to favour a 
more pragmatic focus on energy cooperation, this policy brief argues that a combination of normative 
obligations and pragmatic interests is required − implemented through leverage over Azerbaijan and a 
better coordination of this policy across the EU member states and institutions. 
Recommendations 
 The Council and the Commission should tie progress in energy cooperation to the improvement of 
human rights in Azerbaijan. 
 HR/VP Mogherini should coordinate communication towards Azerbaijan more closely across the 
Commission and ensure that human rights issues are better represented in energy and 
neighbourhood relations. 
 The Council should set specific benchmarks, focusing on the release of political prisoners in the 
months before the European Games scheduled for June in Baku, and discourage high-level EU 
officials from attending the Games if Azerbaijan fails to comply with these conditions.  
 Once the release of political prisoners is achieved, the Council should work with the government of 
Azerbaijan on the gradual improvement of a legal basis for the activities of NGOs and the media. 
This effort should not be overburdened by ambitious and comprehensive democratisation 
programmes but be based on realistic and achievable targets with low political cost for Azerbaijan. 
 The EU Latvian presidency and HR/VP Mogherini should communicate the pragmatic nature of 
this policy and avoid the EU being perceived as a hostile actor by the government of Azerbaijan. 
 The EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus should assume the role of facilitator between 
civil society and the government in Azerbaijan and create opportunities for both parties to discuss 
policy issues. 
 The European Commission should increase its direct support to local media and civil society and 
thereby encourage their participation in Azerbaijan’s policy-making. 
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1. Current state of cooperation 
Azerbaijan stands out among the six Eastern 
European countries that joined the EU’s Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) in 2009. Moldova, Ukraine, 
and Georgia have signed Association 
Agreements and have their minds set on 
membership in the EU. Armenia and Belarus 
have opted for joining the Eurasian Economic 
Union, but Yerevan still pursues the political 
part of the EU Association Agreement. 
Azerbaijan, however, shows no interest in 
moving towards either of these blocs. 
In line with the country’s lack of interest in 
membership, the EU’s policy towards 
Azerbaijan since 2009 has merely aimed at 
broad bilateral political and economic 
integration through the Association process. 
Azerbaijan was thus supposed to adopt and 
implement EU norms on human rights and 
democracy, as well as trade-related standards to 
gain free access to the EU single market and the 
Schengen area. Both the negotiation processes in 
which the EU has been engaged with 
Azerbaijan; on the Association Agreement (AA) 
since 20101 and on the Strategic Modernisation 
Partnership (SMP) since 2013, have entered 
gridlock after years of slack, limited compliance 
with EU norms by the Azerbaijan government, 
and even less, if any, engagement with local 
civil society groups. 
The only meaningful and positive outcomes of 
this process are the agreement between the 
European Commission and the Azerbaijan 
government on the supply of 10 billion cubic 
metres of Azeri gas to Europe starting in 2019,2 
and the Visa Facilitation Agreement,3 which 
                                                     
1 European Commission, “EU launches negotiations on 
Association Agreements with Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia”, 2010 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-10-955_en.htm?locale=en).  
2 European Commission, “Gas from Azerbaijan: 
Commission welcomes final investment decision to 
extract gas pledged for Europe”, 2013 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-
1271_en.htm).  
3 Agreement between the European Union and the 
Republic of Azerbaijan on the facilitation of the issuance 
of visas, Official Journal of the European Union, L 
simplifies the procedure for obtaining the 
Schengen visa for the citizens of Azerbaijan. Yet, 
as the European Commission’s recently 
published progress report states,  
“achievements were overshadowed by 
regression in most areas of deep and 
sustainable democracy, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. The frequency of 
political dialogue between the EU and 
Azerbaijan also decreased, and this had a 
knock-on effect on the formal human rights 
dialogue”.4  
Today Azerbaijan is as distant politically and 
economically from the EU as it was at the 
beginning of Association negotiations, while the 
governance system has become more 
authoritarian, repressive and un-European over 
the past few years.5 
Why has EU policy fared so poorly in 
Azerbaijan, and what can the EU do to break the 
impasse and reverse the crackdown on media 
and civil society in the country?  
2. The view from Baku 
Azerbaijan’s scope of interests with regards to 
cooperation with the EU is quite narrow. The 
country is currently not eligible to conclude the 
DCFTA due to its non-membership of the WTO. 
More importantly, Azerbaijan has no interest in 
the agreement because the DCFTA-implied 
market liberalisation, which promotes private 
business, threatens the monopolistic nature of 
Azerbaijan’s economy that benefits the elite – 
ministers and senior officials in the presidential 
administration who own large businesses and 
                                                                                       
128/49, 2014 (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/ 
EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0430(02)&qid=1426
588716054&from=EN).  
4 European Commission, “Implementation of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan: 
Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions”, 
SWD(2015) 64 final, 2015 (http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ 
pdf/2015/azerbaijan-enp-report-2015_en.pdf).  
5 Human Rights Watch, “Azerbaijan: Escalated 
Crackdown on Critics”, 2015 (www.hrw.org/news/ 
2015/01/29/azerbaijan-escalated-crackdown-critics).  
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enjoy monopoly over various sectors of 
economy.6 
Similarly, the government of Azerbaijan sees 
more risk than gain in carrying out political 
reforms that would promote democracy and the 
greater engagement of civil society in policy-
making. The fear of an active civil society 
intensified after the EuroMaidan movement, 
which resulted in a defeat of the regime of 
Viktor Yanukovich in Ukraine.7 And frequent 
Baku-imposed travel bans on members of its 
civil society further demonstrates that a visa-
free regime with the EU does not necessarily 
conform to the interests of the government. 
Instead, Azerbaijan seeks partnership with the 
EU in the security and energy sectors. In the 
former, Baku expects Brussels to unequivocally 
and consistently support Azerbaijan’s territorial 
integrity, as in the case of Moldova, Georgia, 
and Ukraine. Azerbaijan also wants to see a 
more prominent EU role in the settlement of the 
Nagorno Karabakh conflict.8 In the energy 
sector, Baku presents itself as a viable solution 
to the EU’s energy diversification challenge and 
seeks completion of the Southern Gas Corridor, 
through which it can supply Caspian gas to 
Europe. 
These two issues – Nagorno Karabakh and gas – 
represent the backbone of what the government 
in Baku likes to call a ‘strategic partnership’ 
with the EU. The word ‘strategic’ is intentional. 
Not only does it underline that cooperation in 
                                                     
6 Farid Guliyev, “After Us, the Deluge: Oil Windfalls, 
State Elites and the Elusive Quest for Economic 
Diversification in Azerbaijan”, Caucasus Analytical 
Digest No. 69, 2015. 
7 Elżbieta Kaca, Roderick Parkes & Anita Sobják, 
“Choosing our Geography: 12 Points to Restore 
Meaning to the Eastern Partnership”, PISM, 2014 
(www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=17868); Aleksandra 
Jarosiewicz, “Azerbaijan – a growing problem for the 
West”, OSW, 2014 (www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/ 
osw-commentary/2014-09-15/azerbaijan-a-growing-
problem-west).  
8 Zaur Shiriyev, “Challenges for the EU in the resolution 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: An Azerbaijani 
perspective”, EPC, 2013 (www.epc.eu/documents/ 
uploads/pub_3587_an_azerbaijani_perspective.pdf).  
fields such as energy and security is strategic in 
nature, more importantly it reveals Baku’s wish 
to present EU-Azerbaijan cooperation as a 
partnership of equals. 
Baku’s preferred concept of a business/security 
partnership of equals distances Azerbaijan from 
the Association partnership that exists between 
the EU and other EaP countries, and resembles 
the EU’s existing strategic partnerships. The 
Association model is undesirable for Azerbaijan 
because of its asymmetric nature, which allows 
the EU to criticise the Eastern partners for their 
non-compliance with democratic norms. The 
strategic partnership model is preferred because 
it largely ignores levels of democracy and 
human rights in the EU’s partner countries. 
Among the EU’s strategic partners are not only 
democratic Canada, USA, and Japan, but also 
authoritarian Russia and China. 
President Ilham Aliev therefore seeks to gain 
both international and domestic legitimacy for 
its government through such a strategic 
partnership with the EU. The Azerbaijan 
government is in fact already using the EU for 
domestic legitimacy, albeit in the opposite sense. 
The government has labelled the local NGOs 
and media that are critical of Aliev’s 
authoritarian regime as “fifth column”.9 In the 
narrative created by the regime, these human 
rights activists serve the goals of a Western plot 
against the government of Azerbaijan. The 
image of the West as enemy is cultivated 
because the most vocal international critics of 
the Aliev government are the US and the EU 
themselves, or are based there. The creation of 
this enemy image, of which the EU is part, 
legitimises the regime’s increasing repression. 
Should the Brussels institutions and officials 
stop public criticism of human rights violations 
and form the kind of strategic partnership that is 
pursued by Baku, the image of the EU would 
diametrically change. The legitimising function 
of such an EU, however, would not. 
                                                     
9 Richard D. Kauzlarich, “The Heydar Aliyev Era Ends 
in Azerbaijan Not with a Bang but a Whisper”, 
Brookings, 2015 (www.brookings.edu/research/ 
opinions/2015/01/13-aliyev-era-ends-bang-whisper-
azerbaijan-kauzlarich).  
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The rise of the regime’s anti-Western rhetoric 
coincides with Baku’s recent warming of 
relations with Moscow. Armenia’s infamous U-
turn towards membership of the Eurasian 
Economic Union in September 2013 could be 
viewed as a cautionary tale for EU-Azerbaijani 
relations. For this reason, supporters of the EU’s 
pragmatic approach would see merit in keeping 
Azerbaijan engaged with the EU and away from 
Russian dominance. However, the fear of 
Azerbaijan joining the EEU is exaggerated and 
can be disregarded, for several reasons. First, 
Russia has considerably less economic, political, 
energy or security leverage over Azerbaijan than 
over Armenia, and cannot therefore dictate the 
terms of Baku’s engagement with the EU. 
Second, the Azerbaijani-Russian rapprochement 
can be interpreted as Azerbaijan’s defensive 
response to Russian pressure to join the 
Eurasian Union. Third, Baku’s deepening 
cooperation with the Kremlin has its limits and 
contains risks. Aliev has to ensure that 
strengthening ties with Putin’s Russia will not 
get out of his own control and will not 
transform into dependency on his northern 
neighbour. For this reason, Azerbaijan’s need 
for partnership with the EU has become 
stronger, not weaker. The country needs the EU 
to balance Russia, and vice versa: Baku uses the 
argument about the geopolitical threat of Russia 
to gain undeserved concessions from the EU. 
3. The view from Brussels 
Member state level 
Azerbaijan’s rich energy resources and poor 
human rights record has created a split among 
the EU member states that are the ultimate 
deciders on what kind of relations the EU is 
going to have with Azerbaijan. Member states 
perceive Azerbaijan through the prism of their 
own national interests, which guide their 
bilateral relations with Baku. Those countries 
that prioritise the promotion of human rights in 
their foreign policy, notably the Nordic 
countries, have often been seen as critical of the 
Aliev government’s violations of civil liberties. 
Sweden’s former Foreign Minister Carl Bildt 
was particularly vocal in this regard. Margot 
Wallström, Bildt’s successor, has so far 
maintained this line, publicly condemning the 
restrictions on freedom of speech in 
Azerbaijan.10 
At the other end of the spectrum, Hungarian 
Prime Minister Viktor Orban characterised 
Azerbaijan as a “model country” after signing a 
Joint Declaration on Strategic Partnership with 
President Aliev in November 2014.11 Hungary 
expects to receive a share of Azerbaijani gas 
through the Southern Gas Corridor. Among the 
large member states Italy is the major 
beneficiary of the planned gas pipeline and 
views Azerbaijan primarily in terms of trade 
and energy cooperation. The two countries 
strengthened their relations in July 2014, when 
Matteo Renzi and Ilham Aliev signed a Joint 
Declaration on Strategic Partnership. Italy also 
happens to be Azerbaijan’s largest trade partner, 
accounting for one-quarter of the latter’s exports 
in 2013.12 Another big member state, the UK, 
represents the largest source of foreign 
investment in Azerbaijan, amounting to 52% of 
the country’s FDI in 2012.13 The presence of 
Italy’s ENI and the UK’s BP as the two major 
foreign players in Azerbaijan’s oil and gas sector 
indicates that the priorities of the UK and Italy 
towards Azerbaijan lie in the energy sector.  
Critical statements by the UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office over the repression of 
human rights in Azerbaijan are rare and usually 
limited to the expression of concern, which 
underpins this conclusion.14 
                                                     
10 Margot Wallström, Twitter feed, 10 December 2014 
(https://twitter.com/margotwallstrom/status/5426811
36296910848).  
11 Website of the Hungarian government, “Azeri gas 
key to European energy security”, 2014 
(www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/ 
azeri-gas-key-to-european-energy-security).  
12 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, The foreign trade of Azerbaijan, Exports by 
countries (www.stat.gov.az/source/trade/indexen.php).  
13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, 2014 (http://mfa.gov.az/files/file/ 
Azerbaijan%20-%20UK1.pdf).  
14 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014 
(www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-office-
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The ‘energy vs. human rights’ dichotomy 
explains why Azerbaijan has been such a hard 
case for EU countries to crack unanimously. It 
also explains why the EU managed to impose 
sanctions on Belarus, which has “only” six 
prisoners of conscience at the moment,15 but not 
on Azerbaijan, where the number of prisoners of 
conscience varies between 22 and 129, according 
to various estimates;16 or why the Union 
managed to formulate more or less coherent 
common policies towards five other EaP 
countries, but not towards Azerbaijan. 
Institutional level 
Enhancing democratic governance abroad is not 
only one of the pillars of the ENP, it also 
represents a constitutional obligation under the 
EU Treaty.17 As a guardian of the Treaties, the 
European Commission has to ensure that the 
Union maintains both its normative credibility 
and lucrative partnership. This is why the EU as 
a whole, unlike Hungary, should not ignore the 
repression of human rights in Azerbaijan. Yet 
neither can it disregard strategic energy 
interests, unlike Sweden, which has practically 
                                                                                       
troubled-by-sentencing-of-election-monitors-in-
azerbaijan).  
15 Viasna, “Human rights situation in 2014: Trends and 
evaluation”, 2015 
(https://spring96.org/en/news/75286). 
16 Amnesty International, “Guilty of defending rights: 
Azerbaijan’s human rights defenders and activists 
behind bars”, 2015 (www.amnesty.org/en/documents/ 
eur55/1077/2015/en/); European Commission, 
“Implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy in Azerbaijan: Progress in 2014 and 
recommendations for actions”, SWD(2015) 64 final, 2015 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/pdf/2015/azerbaijan-enp-
report-2015_en.pdf). 
17 European Commission, “Neighbourhood at the 
crossroads – taking stock of a year of challenges”, 2014 
(http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
315_en.htm); Consolidated version of the Treaty on 
European Union, Article 21, Official Journal, 2012 
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ 
PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012M/TXT&from=EN; Treaty of 
Lisbon, Article 10A, Official Journal, 2007 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:12007L/TXT&from=EN).  
nothing to gain from the EU-Azerbaijan gas 
cooperation. 
The European Commission’s track record of 
engagement with Azerbaijan in recent years 
shows that the institution tried to strike a 
balance between the two options. Yet the 
balancing act was poorly managed and 
incoherent. Former Commissioner for 
Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Štefan 
Füle was seen to be more unequivocal on the 
human rights issue, while Jose Manuel Barroso 
and Herman Van Rompuy tended to take a 
softer line. Former HR/VP Catherine Ashton, 
meanwhile, was somewhat inert over 
Azerbaijan. Moreover, while former 
Commissioner for Digital Affairs Neelie Kroes 
strongly criticised the repression of media 
freedom in Azerbaijan, former Commissioner 
for Energy Gunther Oettinger emphasised 
strategic partnership with Baku, yet turned a 
blind eye to human rights violations. 
Since the change of guard at the EU, the lack of 
coordination seems to be less of an issue but the 
lack of a balanced approach has become more 
visible. New presidents of the European Council 
Donald Tusk and the Commission Jean-Claude 
Juncker, as well as new Commissioner for 
Neighbourhood Policy Johannes Hahn, have 
been mute over the worsening human rights 
situation in Azerbaijan since assuming their 
posts. The fact that the highest EU official to 
visit Azerbaijan since the formation of the new 
Commission and Council is Commissioner for 
Energy Maroš Šefčovič, who has twice travelled 
to Baku since assuming the post in November 
2014, shows that the Commission and the 
Council have so far disregarded the human 
rights issue, focusing instead on an easier target; 
energy cooperation, where the interests of 
Brussels and Baku meet. 
According to the newly unveiled Energy Union 
Package, the diversification of gas supply is one 
of the core goals of the European Commission 
and Azerbaijan plays an important part in this 
strategy. The EU is set to “use all its foreign 
policy instruments to establish strategic energy 
partnerships with increasingly important 
producing and transit countries”, Azerbaijan 
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among them.18 Second, commenting on the 
current review of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy, High Representative Federica Mogherini 
stated that the EU  
“need[s] to move from an approach that has 
been very much based on the judgement on 
the evaluation of the progress in our 
relationship […] to a more cooperation 
oriented approach between equal partners.”19  
Commissioner for Neighbourhood Policy 
Johannes Hahn provided more clarification: 
 “We need not cover every sector with every 
partner. For those who do not currently want 
to engage deeply, let's narrow the focus to 
make our partnerships more effective.”20 
This must be music to the ears of Azerbaijan’s 
leadership. Even if such comments by EU 
officials do not intend to play down the 
importance of human rights situation in 
Azerbaijan, the government in Baku will 
interpret them as such, especially in conjunction 
with the goals of Energy Union Package.  
Moreover, a purely pragmatic approach would 
certainly contradict the pledge made by 
Mogherini during her parliamentary hearing in 
October 2014, when she referred to human 
rights as a compass in all her relations with 
third countries. With specific reference to 
Azerbaijan at that time she said that 
“precisely because we are investing a lot on 
energy with Azerbaijan, we need to stress 
even more the need to respect human rights, 
                                                     
18 European Commission, “Energy Union Package”, A 
Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a 
Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, Brussels, 
COM(2015) 80 final. 
19 European Commission, “Joint press conference by 
High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
MOGHERINI and Commissioner Johannes HAHN on 
European Neighbourhood Policy Review”, 
SPEECH/15/4553. 
20 European Commission, “Joint press conference by 
High Representative/Vice-President Federica 
MOGHERINI and Commissioner Johannes HAHN on 
European Neighbourhood Policy Review”, 
SPEECH/15/4553. 
especially in the fields of media and political 
activists.”21  
Since then, her spokesperson has made two 
statements on the issue. In the first, mild 
condemnation of the Azerbaijani authorities for 
the arrest of investigative journalist Khadija 
Ismailova fell short of demanding her release.22 
The second statement was even more 
diplomatic, mentioning the government’s 
decision to close the Baku bureau of Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, while commending 
President Aliev for pardoning several political 
prisoners. The statement did not mention that 
many more are still behind bars.23 We should 
not be surprised if the government of 
Azerbaijan perceives such soft censure as tacit 
approval of its neglect of human rights and sees 
no obligation to respect its international 
commitments to fundamental freedoms. 
The European Parliament, on the other hand, 
has expressed a more solid position.24 In its 
resolution of 18th September 2014, the EP made 
its support for signing the Strategic 
Modernisation Partnership conditional on the 
release of human rights defenders and the 
overall improvement of media freedom and 
protection of human rights. It also urged the 
Commission, the EEAS, and the Council to focus 
on the issue of politically motivated detentions, 
to cease all assistance to Azerbaijan that is not 
oriented to human rights and civil society 
empowerment, and to consider targeted 
sanctions if the repression persists. 
                                                     
21 European Parliament, The Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, “Hearing of Federica Mogherini”, Verbatim 
report, 2014. 
22 European External Action Service, “Statement by the 
Spokesperson on the arrest of Azerbaijani journalist 
Khadija Ismayilova”, 2014 (http://eeas.europa.eu/ 
statements-eeas/2014/141209_01_en.htm).  
23 European External Action Service, “Statement by the 
Spokesperson on the latest developments in 
Azerbaijan”, 2014 http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2014/141230_05_en.htm  
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According to Green Party MEP Paolo 
Bergamaschi, the Azerbaijani lobby in the EP 
has been increasingly marginalised: “[t]hey 
don’t dare say anything because the opposition 
to the crackdown has grown very strong”.25 This 
makes the Parliament the strongest defender of 
the EU’s normative agenda, but its policy-
making power in foreign policy is secondary to 
the EEAS, to the Commission, and the Council. 
4. A pragmatic approach to 
normative goals 
Two conclusions can be drawn from the 
overview of the two sides’ positions. First, “[t]he 
EU-Azerbaijan relationship is a tale of 
mismatched objectives and ambitions”.26 In 
other words, the goals of EU policy are either 
not interesting for the government of 
Azerbaijan, or directly oppose the latter’s 
objectives. Second, the lack of coordination and 
consensus among member states and across and 
within the institutions over human rights issue 
in Azerbaijan prevents the EU from exercising a 
sufficiently strong policy tool to overcome 
Azerbaijan’s unwillingness to reform. 
A strong and adequate human rights policy 
towards Azerbaijan should include two new 
elements. The first is energy. The coupling of 
energy and human rights both strengthens the 
EU’s bargaining position and stems from the 
Union’s guiding principles. The planned 10 bcm 
of gas delivery from the Caspian Sea to Europe 
meets only 2% of the total EU gas demand, 
while it exceeds the current volume of total gas 
exports of Azerbaijan, which was a little more 
than 7 bcm in 2013.27 Moreover, Azeri gas will 
primarily benefit Italy, which is one of the least 
dependent member states on Russian gas 
                                                     
25 Azadliq, “Either We Have Concrete Signs or Voices in 
the European Parliament Calling for a Boycott Will 
Grow Stronger”, 2015 (www.azadliq.org/content/ 
article/26790132.html). 
26 Jacqueline Hale, “EU relations with Azerbaijan: More 
for Less?”, Open Society Institute Brussels, 2012. 
27 The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, Energy, Export of energy products 
(www.stat.gov.az/source/balance_fuel/indexen.php).  
supply and in no urgent need of supply 
diversification.28 Second, the EU Strategic 
Framework on Human Rights lists energy 
among the areas of external action in which the 
EU “will integrate the promotion of human 
rights”.29 The document states that “[t]he EU 
will place human rights at the centre of its 
relations with all third countries, including its 
strategic partners” which further indicates that 
strategic nature of bilateral cooperation aspired 
by Aliev’s government does not relieve the EU 
of the obligation to promote human rights in 
Azerbaijan (cf. also Articles 8 and 21 TEU). In 
official visits to Baku the EU should be 
represented not only by Energy Commissioner 
Šefčovič, but also by Neighbourhood Policy 
Commissioner Hahn and/or High 
Representative Mogherini. This is both a 
symbolic gesture and a practical way to ensure 
that cooperation on energy would be 
accompanied by negotiations on human rights. 
Whether or not the two sides manage to revive 
negotiations on the Association Agreement or 
Strategic Modernisation Partnership, or decide 
to pursue a new format of contractual 
relationship, the formula of ‘gas + human rights’ 
should guide EU policy. 
The second element is public criticism. The EU’s 
normative power and its influence on public 
opinion make the Union a strong soft power 
actor, especially in the neighbourhood. 
Azerbaijan is particularly sensitive about its 
international reputation and has been investing 
huge sums of money on acclaimed lobby firms 
to promote its image abroad, which makes 
Azerbaijan strongly dependent on the Union’s 
public rhetoric. The upcoming European Games, 
a continent-wide Olympic tournament to be 
held in Baku in June, is a matter of pride for 
Ilham Aliev and provides the EU with 
                                                     
28 European Commission, “Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council”, COM(2014) 330 final, 2014 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/ 
?uri=CELEX:52014DC0330&from=EN).  
29 Council of the European Union, “The EU Strategic 
Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy”, 11855/12.  
8 | GELA MERABISHVILI 
 
appropriate leverage. Refusal by the EU and its 
high officials (excluding the heads of member 
states) to attend the Games due to the 
worsening democratic climate would be a 
serious blow to a carefully nurtured 
international image, and thus represents a good 
bargaining chip for the EU. Linking human 
rights with energy and public criticism creates a 
condition in which Azerbaijan’s compliance to 
the EU norms brings benefit for both sides, 
while non-compliance leaves the country worse 
off. Seeking to export its gas to Europe and 
maintain international legitimacy, the 
government of Azerbaijan would be more 
encouraged to protect human rights by this 
strategy than before. 
While the European Parliament’s September 
resolution provides a basis for this policy, it is 
up to Mogherini and the EEAS to develop it into 
a policy initiative that will represent the Union 
with a single voice. However, to ensure the 
actual existence of this single voice, it is 
necessary to bring those member states and 
parts of the Commission on board who 
generally oppose a strict normative approach 
towards Azerbaijan. Since Latvia enjoys closer 
ties with Azerbaijan and has defined both the 
Eastern Partnership and Central Asia as foreign 
policy priorities of its Presidency of the 
European Council,30 the Latvian presidency and 
upcoming Eastern Partnership summit in May 
in Riga represents an opportunity to push for 
the formulation of a common position in the 
Council. Limiting the policy tools to EU public 
criticism and the possibility to cancel official 
visit to the European Games, while excluding 
the sanctions option, could be a compromise 
solution that garners support from all member 
states. Similarly, HR/VP Mogherini should 
more closely coordinate communication 
towards Azerbaijan across the Commission and 
ensure that human rights issues are better 
                                                     
30 Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, “The programme of the Latvian Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union” 
(https://eu2015.lv/images/PRES_prog_2015_EN-
final.pdf).  
represented in energy and neighbourhood 
relations. 
The success of this policy tool very much 
depends on how this conditionality is 
communicated to Azerbaijan. To mitigate the 
risk that the government of Azerbaijan perceives 
public criticism as an attempt at international 
marginalisation or regime change, shared values 
such as Azerbaijan’s secular character, religious 
freedom in the country, its stable economic 
growth and independent foreign policy, should 
also be emphasised. Here the role of Latvian 
presidency and HR/VP Mogherini is crucial to 
present EU policy not as an ultimatum, but as a 
serious recommendation, which lays the 
foundation for pragmatic partnership between 
the EU and Azerbaijan. To underline the 
pragmatic nature of this strategy, the policy has 
to include specific benchmarks, starting from 
the release of political prisoners, preferably to be 
negotiated before the European Games start in 
June, continued by gradual legal reform to 
repeal the restrictions on media and civil society 
organisations. The strategy should avoid 
demands for ambitious and comprehensive 
democratic reforms that would be politically 
very costly for Aliev’s government. Instead the 
EU should focus on small achievements in the 
field of human rights and civil liberties that will 
be easier for the government of Azerbaijan to 
swallow. 
The European Union Special Representative for 
the South Caucasus, a position currently held by 
Herbert Salber acting under the authority of the 
High Representative, should play a greater role 
in facilitating dialogue between the government 
and civil society in Azerbaijan, thereby 
contributing to more participatory policy-
making in the country. His mandate requires 
him “to contribute to the implementation of the 
Union's human rights policy” and “develop 
contacts with governments, parliaments, other 
key political actors, the judiciary and civil 
society in the region”.31 For example, Peter 
                                                     
31 Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/332 of 2 March 2015 
extending the mandate of the European Union Special 
Representative for the South Caucasus and the crisis in 
Georgia, Official Journal of the European Union, 2015 
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Semneby, the EU Special Representative for the 
South Caucasus between 2006 and 2011, often 
acted as a facilitator between the government 
and opposition parties during the numerous 
political crises in Georgia.  
Such diplomacy can be accompanied by 
increased financial support for local NGOs and 
media, which has already been underway since 
the final months of the previous Commission.32 
In 2014, the EU committed €21 million for 
education and civil society through the 
European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)33 
and an additional €3 million to support 14 
projects on democracy and human rights carried 
out by local NGOs in partnership with foreign 
counterparts.34 Such an EU effort is often limited 
by the government-set legal restrictions on civil 
society organisations. The best way to counter 
the restrictions and increase EU presence in 
Azerbaijan is to bring more of Azerbaijan to the 
EU: more Erasmus-type scholarships for 
Azerbaijani students in European universities 
will create a more positive image of the EU in 
the country. The Commission and the Council 
can also start to think about revoking a visa 
regime for certain citizens of Azerbaijan, such as 
those affiliated with NGOs and the media, etc., 
despite the fact that the government does not 
meet the EU-set criteria and has not yet started a 
Visa Liberalisation Action Plan; the final step 
towards a visa-free regime. Such a move would 




32 European Commission, “EU-Azerbaijan: reaffirmed 
commitment to promote democracy and human rights”, 
2014 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
982_en.htm). 
33 European Commission, “Commission implementing 
Decision of 3.9.2014 on the Annual Action Programme 
2014 in favour of the Republic of Azerbaijan to be 
financed from the general budget of the European 
Union”, C(2014) 6280 final, 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/sites/devco/files/aap-az-2014_en.pdf).  
34 European Commission, “Implementation of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan: 
Progress in 2014 and recommendations for actions”, 
SWD(2015) 64 final, 2015 (http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/ 
pdf/2015/azerbaijan-enp-report-2015_en.pdf). 
first and foremost benefit the civil society of 
Azerbaijan. 
These measures will help to increase public 
support for the EU integration in Azerbaijan, 
which is lower (34%) than in neighbouring 
Armenia (40%) and Georgia (65%).35 With 
greater public interest in the EU it will be harder 
for the government of Azerbaijan to ignore 
burgeoning pro-EU public opinion, which 
means more accountability and a higher chance 
of Baku’s compliance with EU norms. In a wider 
geopolitical context, the improvement of human 
rights in Azerbaijan and the country’s political 
and economic rapprochement with Europe 
could have a positive effect on Iran and Central 
Asia. It could also strengthen the EU’s position 
in the region. 
                                                     
35 Caucasus Barometer 2013, The Caucasus Research 
Resource Centers (http://caucasusbarometer.org/en/ 
cb2013/EUSUPP/).  
